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The aim of this paper is to try to measure the market power of Microsoft in the 
software industry. For this purpose, we developed a two time argumentation. First we 
measured the scale economies within this industry. Then we assumed the crude 
hypothesis that the results of a firm in this industry are linked to his size, according to 
the scale argument. We then compared expected profits and actual profits of 
Microsoft. The results tended to show that Microsoft have profits in excess of what a 
similar firm is expected to benefit from, if it does not have market power. 
 




The aim of this paper is to try to measure the market power into the software industry. 
For this purpose, we imagined a two steps methodology. The first step consisted to 
identify and measure the main structural characteristic of the industry, if one emerges. 
Software being an immaterial good, it is natural to think that scales economies 
constitute this characteristic. The second step consisted in looking at the relations 
between different measures of profit and the scale of the sales, in this industry. We 
then put face to face expected and actual profits of Microsoft. We used a proprietary 
database on the 35 first companies of the industry for 10 years, based on annual 
reports and Form 10K (and 20F). This paper is divided in two sections: measure of the 
scale economies (1) and measure of the market power of Microsoft (2). 
 
1) Scale economies in the software industry 
 
The objective of this section is to try to measure scale economies in the software 
industry. It is obvious that scale economies exist because R&D spending and “sales 
and marketing” costs do appear as fixed costs. On the other side, weak (re)production 
costs (variable costs) strengthen scale economies. We put forward the hypothesis that 
scale economies are driven by demand and that we can speak of instant scalability
1 to 
name this kind of scale economies. Scale economies will then depend on the dynamic 
of demand and we need to measure them over a number of years. This is what we are 
going to do in this section knowing that, to our purpose, no work has been done on the 
                                                           
1 Cf. Liebowitz & Margolis (2001). 









































2, contrary to what exists for many other sectors such as banks 
(Benson & alii, 1982), assurances (Katrishen & Scordis, 1998), food industry 
(MacDonald & Ollinger, 2000), network industries (Gathon, 1987), transports (Cowie 




The literature on scale economies is huge. We will present a synthesis of recent work, 
useful for our purpose. Scale economies do exist if (and only if) medium total cost of a 
company is growing slower than its output. A coherent representation of scale 
economies is given by the neo-classic production function of the form F(Yi, Xj) where 
the Yi are the outputs and Xj the inputs. Under certain conditions (Christensen & alii, 
1973), the production process can be equivalently described by a cost function (dual): 
C = G(Yi, Pk) where C represents total costs and Pk represents the prices of the Xj 
inputs (k = j). The conditions for this duality are that production factor’s prices are 
exogenous for the firms and that the objectives of the latter are to minimise costs. This 
seems to be the case for the software industry. 
The cost functions the most widely used are the classical Cobb-Douglas and the 
Translog (transcendental logarithmic production frontiers) promoted by Christensen & 
alii
3. They are: 
- Cobb-Douglas: lnC = a + b lnY + A + B + e where A represents inputs costs 
and B represents control variables and e a random error term. 
- Translog: lnC = a + b lnY + c (lnY)
2 + A + B + e where A represents inputs 
costs also used in quadratic form including cross-variables multiplications and B 
represents control variables. These last ones are often omitted because the number of 
explanatory variables becomes quickly too high. 
We are not going to choose the Translog but the Cobb-Douglas. There are many 
reasons. The first one is the parsimony principle. The second is that the theoretic 
advantages of the translog («  these functions provide a local second-order 
approximation of any production frontier. The resulting frontiers permit a greater 
variety of substitution and transformation patterns than frontiers based on constant 
elasticities of substitution and transformation  », Christensen & alii, p. 28) can be 
cancelled by practical problems. The coefficients estimations are less precise and 
multicolinearity can be high (Webster & Scott, 1996). Let us add the difficulty of 
interpretation of the numerous coefficients. Clark & Speaker (1994) show that 
Translog has other drawbacks: it allows multiple outputs but is not estimated at the 
zero point. Another problem comes from the fact that with the Translog, one needs to 
evaluate for any output, the price of capital and the price of labour. These data are 
often not available and, in these cases, allocated in an arbitrary way that nullifies the 
interest of the translog. In fact, the differences between the estimates of the scale 
economies based on Translog or Cobb-Douglas are weak. McNutlty (2000) compared 
the two methods on a sample of 130 commercial banks over 5 years (from 1985 to 
                                                           
2 Technical scale economies in software development have been checked. Banker & Kemerer, (1994) show a 
mix of economies and diseconomies of scale. Banker & Slaughter (1997) reach the same results on software 
maintenance. 
3 One has to quote the Léontieff function. 








































81989) and on the pooling of these five years. He also tested the fact of including or not 
interest costs in total costs. He obtained 12 results of scale economies for each method. 
11 results gave differences of less than 1% and the last one a difference of 6%. We are 
going to follow Cowie & Riddington (1996) who tested a Translog function (« After 
some experimentation with the Translog, we came to the conclusion that there was no 
evidence that the higher order terms were significant », p. 1030), and use a Cobb-
Douglas function. We reach the same conclusion after having made the same 
experiment. 
 
b) Model specification 
 
  The model is expressed as: 
  Ln(TC) = a + bLn(GP) + cSoftwareRatio + dGPRatio + e 
Where TC = total cost; GP = gross profit; SoftwareRatio = percentage of turnover 
realised in software; GPRatio = ratio of gross profit on employment. 
Pre-packaged software firms usually do have two distinct outputs, software licences 
and support on one side and services on the other side. The turnover of these two 
activities is often available on Form 10K but we have neither the split of manpower 
between these two activities nor the split of capital use. In these conditions, it is not 
possible to identify a cost function of these two activities. We considered a unique 
output measured by the gross profit
4. But we controlled for the output-mix by the 
variable SoftwareRatio. Concerning capital cost, the software industry is a light 
industry, fixed capital consisting mostly of microcomputers. With regard to price of 
labour, software firms are largely internationalised and have manpower in many 
countries. We included a control variable of the labour costs by the GPRatio. We 





We used a proprietary database on the 35 first firms of the software industry over 10 
years from 1994 to 2003. It is based on annual reports and form 10K (or 20F). Are 
excluded because of lack of information, IBM, Fujitsu and SAS (it is not a public 
company) (table 1). 
                                                           
4 The Cobb-Douglas function allows only one output. 








































8Table 1  Data summary statistics (year 2000) 
 
N=34  Total Costs  Gross Profit  SoftwareRatio (%)  GP/employment 
Mean 1083  1653  75  182 
Standard deviation  (1633)  (3579)  (14)  (84) 
Median 8632  693  75  169 




We evaluated the model over ten years from 1994 to 2003 with the OLS method. To 
have a better precision, we evaluated two years together each time. As scale 
economies vary from year to year, this method allows for smoothing differences for 
companies who have different fiscal years and can be confronted with different 
demands for the same reference year (table 2). 
 
Table 2    Regression coefficients 
 
Variables       









































N  62 64 66 51 41 
R2  0.977 0.956 0.942 0.949 0.980 
F  832 463 341 301 618 
t-ratio in parentheses 
 
The coefficient of Gross Profit is statistically significantly different than 0 at the 1 for 
1000 level. The control variables can be significant but do not have influence on the 
results. The coefficient of Gross Profit being less than 1, economies of scale do exist. 
With the functional form we use, they are simply the inverse of that coefficient. 
   SCE  (2003/2002)  =  1.159 
   SCE  (2001/2000)  =  1.157 
   SCE  (1999/1998)  =  1.151 
   SCE  (1997/1996)  =  1.047 
   SCE  (1995/1994)  =  1.030 
Quartile estimations do not change the picture. The estimation of the economies of 
scale on the first decile gives the result of 1.157. Scale economies do exist in the 
software industry but are far from the radical scale economies assumed by McKensie 
& Lee (2002) or Shy (2001) where all costs are considered as fixed (a constant). In 
fact, R&D costs and “sales and marketing” costs can be split in two parts, a fixed one 








































8and a variable one. Our empirical results tend to show that the variable part must not 
be forgotten. We build on theses measures of the economies of scale to analyse the 
market power in the software industry. 
 
2) The analysis of market power in the software industry 
 
The concept of market power is fundamental in industrial economics (Schmalensee & 
Willig, 1989; Scherer & Ross, 1990; Martin, 1993), but it is at the same time a very 
controversial question. The problem is to know and to verify if a firm’s or firms’ 
dominant position is due to higher efficiency or to market power exploitation. This 
section of the paper regroups three sub-parts: the first introduces the question of 
market power, the second presents data and statistical analysis of our measures of 
Microsoft’s market power and the last one discusses some results of this work. 
 
a)  The market power question: an introduction 
 
The identification of a market power is a prerequisite in any antitrust action. Market 
power is not punishable in itself, but it opens to the analyses of anti-competition 
practices. As there is no possibility for anti-competition practices without market 
power, this theme is strategic in all the antitrust cases. Nevertheless market power 
cannot be measured directly. Let us just introduce the point by presenting some 
arguments used for the Microsoft trial. The classical approach to market power is 
twofold: 
On one side the measure of market shares is a good indicator of a “potential” market 
power. In this case the relevant question is the identification of the relevant market. 
This point is a real source of conflicts between the confronting parties. A good 
example is given in the U.S. versus Microsoft case, where the Government considered 
Microsoft in a monopoly position in the microcomputer based on Intel platform, 
because the firm had 95% of the market share (Gilbert & Katz, 2001). Microsoft, 
through the voice of Schmalensee (1999), defended the idea that competition on the 
microcomputer market was a competition between platforms and not between 
operating systems, where the platform concept included middleware and this last one 
included the browser Internet, Java etc. Schmalensee maintained that Windows 
suffered for the potential competition by present and future platforms. This was the 
reason why Microsoft had been obliged to tie operating software and browser
5. 
Schmalensee maintained that competition is very high in the software for 
microcomputer and that the market positions are fragile. The economist referred to 
some examples such as word processor, spreadsheet and database. He specified that 
markets benefiting from network effects can be “winner takes all” markets, but that the 
induced monopoly positions are temporary
6. The author specified finally that the 
competition toward Netscape had not an anti-competitive character and that it had 
                                                           
5 For a different interpretation of this action of tying see Carlton & Waldman (2002). 
6 We will estimate the length of the “temporary” term later in our paper. In any case let’s underline that 
Microsoft has had a dominant position in the operating system software for microcomputers for twenty years. 








































8produced welfare effects for the consumers (in terms of lowering prices)
7. The entry 
conditions aspect (did a firm raise entry barriers on its market segment?) is difficult to 
analyse too because identifying predatory pricing (Areeda & Turner, 1975, Baumol, 
1996) is impeded by the problems of the choice and the measure of costs
8. 
On another side, the pioneer works on industrial economics have developed an 
approach in terms of price/cost difference
9. A firm which can establish, on a medium 
term, prices higher than its marginal costs (or average costs) enjoys market power. 
This market power can be found on its profit level. The measure problems are a large 
number, starting with the measure of costs we just underlined. These problems are 
even stronger in the software case. In fact the costs of embodied (re)production of 
these disembodied goods today are near to zero
10. It doesn’t follow that the marginal 
costs of sale of these goods are near to zero. But it seems likely to be more difficult to 
identify them than the marginal costs of embodied goods. One has to try to avoid 
measuring the marginal costs in the case of scale industries like the software industry. 
The recent economic literature acknowledges the difficulty (even the impossibility) to 
measure the price/cost margin. Following Bresnahan (1989), the price/cost margin at 
present is no more considered a measurable data, but a variable to be estimated 
through econometric methods. The analyses concern then specific industries and 
require a specification of the competition conditions. These models are called 
“structural” by the economic literature and Bresnahan (1989) clarifies: “An advantage 
of the use of structural econometric models and explicit theories of industry 
equilibrium is that the class of models the data are allowed to treat is made explicit” 
(p. 1031). These models require putting together many data, because it is necessary to 
evaluate the curves of the supply, of the demand and to advance some behavioural 
hypotheses. There are also models which need a lower amount of data, the reduced 
form methods. Hyde & Perloff (1995), working through simulations on three main 
approaches, the structural model and two reduced forms by Panzar & Rosse (1987) 
and by Hall (1988), investigate their capacity of measuring market power. The authors 
show that the structural models are adequate to their aim and that the Hall’s method is 
useful only when there are constant returns to scale, while the Panzar & Rosse model 
does not fit with the Cobb-Douglas standard specifications (of the production 
function). The authors’ conclusion is that “The strength of the structural model is that 
it provides an estimate of market power, unlike the other two models” (p. 481). 
Works on Microsoft are numerous too, but we found only one publication dealing with 
a direct measure of the firm’s market power, Khan, Islam & Ahmed (2004). The 
authors use the Panzar & Rosse’s model in its simplest version and they specify the 
                                                           
7 Gasser & Allen (2001) develop the argument, about the ordered split-up of Microsoft by Judge Jackson, that 
“one monopoly is better than two”, on the classical idea that a vertical monopoly charges only one monopoly 
profit instead of two if there are two firms (OS and application). 
8 Areeda & Turner (1975) proposed the average variable cost as a proxy of marginal cost to identify a predatory 
cost. Baumol (1996) suggested the average avoidable cost (marginal cost plus non-sunk product specific fixed 
costs). Let us note than in the case of Internet Explorer, Microsoft sponsorised the diffusion of this package 
through exclusive contracts with Internet access providers and personal computers manufacturers. 
9 See Werden (2001) and Reddy & alii (2001) for a presentation of the measuring problems applied to Windows 
case. 
10 Klein (2001) underlines this aspect, but he forgets, like other authors, that it is the marginal cost of sale and 
not the marginal cost of (re) production that is to be taken into consideration. 








































8following function: Q = A W
x I
y where Q is the output (the sales in this case), W is the 
labour cost (here the average wages in the software industry), and I is the interest rate. 
The period is 1994-2003 and quarterly data are used. But the model seems to be badly 
specified for an industry such as the software one. In fact the Microsoft’s output 
depends mainly on the demand and not on the wages or even less on the capital cost: 
the capital depreciation cost is light in the software industry. Moreover, Microsoft has 
never used bank loans, having a very large availability of funds. The authors use a 
Cobb-Douglas form which is not suitable for their type of model (Hyde & Perloff, but 
the same critical observation was advanced by Panzar & Rosse). Finally, we can also 
apply to our case the critical observations of Boyer (Boyer, 1996) toward the structural 
model: it is an oligopoly model, meaning that it assumes that the market power is an 
industry dimension and not a firm’s one. Due to all these reasons - absence of data for 
specifying the structural model, inadequacy of the reduced form - we have to follow a 
transversal way, as it is proposed by Carlton & Perloff (1994). 
We propose the following method for measuring the presence of market power of 
firms in an industry with scale economies. The presence of market power should give 
place to higher prices and consequently higher profits, but the critical question is 
“higher than what”? Higher than the expected profits as a function of the scale 
economies in such an industry.  If we accept the hypothesis that scale economies 
represent the main characteristic of this industry and that there are no important 
possibilities of higher efficiency for a firm in the industry, then we can propose to 
identify the market power of a firm in the following way: 
- Test a measure of the scale economies in the industry, as we did in the previous 
section; 
- Find and test through a regression model the relation between profit variables and the 
firms’ size in the industry (excluding the firm taken into consideration); 
- Estimate the expected profit value for a firm, which has the same sales as that of the 
firm under examination; 
- Compare the estimated values and the real ones: a significant deviation (in the 
econometric meaning) in favour of the real value shows the presence of market power. 
This deviation represents the monopoly power of our examined firm. 
 
Demsetz (1982) in his article on the entry barriers explains that “the equalization of 
profit rates through competition, however, is a proposition logically valid only with 
respect to investment on the margin
11 of alternative economic activities. Only if all 
inputs are available in perfectly elastic supply does this imply equality between 
average profit rates” (p. 47). Later in the same text, the author specifies that “a barrier 
to competitors may arise from the superior efficiency of existing firms, in which case 
their low prices are precisely what competitive markets are expected to bring forth” (p. 
52). We have to accept the likelihood of the argument of Demsetz and of the Chicago 
school. Access conditions to the inputs and superior effectiveness can be the reason for 
higher profits, which do not indicate, in that case, the presence of market power. Here 
the access to inputs conditions are a priori the same for all the actors. On the contrary, 
the hypothesis of the difficulty to realize efficiency significantly superior to the 
                                                           
11 Underlined by the author. 








































8average efficiency is fundamental for our scope. The arguments are of two types here: 
on one side the software firms are small sized and the Libenstein “X inefficiencies” 
have low possibility of existence. On the other side, a superior efficiency, if it does 
exist, can be present only in the software conception/production, identified as an R&D 
activity of the sector’s firms. Cohen et al (1987, 1989) and Cohen (1985) have shown 
in their works that the large firm’s advantages in innovation, measured by the 
R&D/sales ratio, are not significant, because there is no correlation between R&D 
expenditures and sales. It is necessary to look at the consequences of the different 
hypotheses: a large firm’s advantage should be translated into a weaker R&D/sales 
ratio, in respect to the small and medium sized firms. The same, a disadvantage should 
be translated into a R&D/sales ratio higher for the large firms than for the small and 
medium ones. What happens in the software industry case? This industry is 
characterized by a low variance of R&D ratio (see the next paragraph). As for the 
R&D/sales ratio, Microsoft is very close to the average in the third quartile. In this 
case it isn’t possible to refer to a superior efficacy. 
One of the main arguments of the theoreticians of the new economy is the well known 
Schumpeter paradigm. Innovation, being a risky activity, has the right to benefit from 
a temporary monopoly position. The issue is a priori contradictory, since monopoly 
prevents innovation, following the same Schumpeter. There is therefore a tension 
between monopoly and innovation on one side and competition and innovation on the 
other side. The innovation dynamics (which is the capitalism dynamics, in 
Schumpeter) should follow the pattern: innovation1- monopoly1- competition- 
innovation2- monopoly 2, etc. 
From the welfare point of view, monopoly time is a lost time. But this time is a 
necessity, otherwise there would be a low or very low level of innovation. How long 
can this monopoly time last? One usually explains that new technology sectors are 
characterised by high dynamics and that monopoly length is between three and five 
years, which is conform to the accepted idea of a return on a risky investment. Is this 
the case for Microsoft? Our database includes 10 years and we take this length of time 
as sufficiently long for reasonably measuring the monopoly or not monopoly of 
Microsoft position
12. 
                                                           
12 Teece & Coleman (1998) and Pleatsikas & Teece argue that a ten years length of time is reasonable to 
evaluate a market power position. 









































b)  The measures of Microsoft market power 
 
- Database: 
We used the same database as before. It contains, among other things, the following 
variables: sales, R&D, net income (NI), operating income (OI) and shareholder’s 
equity (SE). The descriptive statistics for one year are the following (table 4): 
 
Table 4      Year 2000 in percentage 
 
N=34 NI/sales  OI/sales  SE/sales  R&D/sales 
Mean 7.2  10.0  79.2  16.1 
Standard deviation  14.1  15.2  42.5  5.5 
Median 8.6  9.6  69.6  15.5 
Maximum 41.0  47.6  189.3*  29.4 
Minimum  - 30.4  - 20.2  - 1.7  5.1 
Microsoft 41.0  47.6  180.2  16.4 
* Intuit invested in start up and includes the value of these assets in shareholders’ equity. 
 
  - Relations between profit and turnover 
We used three variables for profit with the aim of increasing the range of assumptions, 
if any: net income (NI), operating income (OI) and stockholder equity (SE). 
Stockholder equity has a special significance in the software industry: generally firms 
do not distribute any profit to their shareholders and stockholder equity represents a 
good estimation of past profits. The choice of the scale economies is the following: 
Years 1998 – 2003: 1.16 
Years 1994 – 1997: 1.10 
In the previous paragraph, 1.16 represented the average of the yearly SCE (scale 
economies) for the period 1998-2003. The average scale economies for 1994-1997 
were 1.04. We chose a margin higher than 5% for these years because the number of 
firms is lower, i.e. a SCE value of 1.10. 
The estimated regressions have the following form: 
NI= a + bSalespower + e with Salespower = salespowerSCE 
OI = a+ bSalespower + e with Salespower = salespowerSCE 
SE = a+ bSalespower + e with Salespower = salespowerSCE 
Table 5 gives the results of regressions with operating income over the 10 years (t 
value between brackets). B is always significant. Despite the elementary nature of the 
model, the estimate appears to be robust. Same results are obtained with net income 
and shareholders equity (Cf. annexe). 
 
Table 5    Estimations of Operating Income 
 



























































































t-ratios in parentheses; *:p < 0,001 
 
  - Values of profit for a turnover equal to the one of Microsoft (table 6) : 
One has to compute the estimated values from the regression formula and the 95% 
confidence interval. Let us recall that the more a point is faraway from mean, the 
larger the confidence interval. Table 6 gives the expected results of Microsoft. 
 
Table 6      Microsoft: Expected Results 
 
Year  Expected NI  Expected OI  Expected SE 
2003  8778 ± 1301  13009 ± 1613  27586 ± 5584 
2002  5974 ± 1507  10447 ± 1544  19457 ± 4988 
2001  5322 ± 1827  9320 ± 2243  17425 ± 4252 
2000  4966 ± 1307  7491 ± 1544  15495 ± 3681 
1999  2918 ± 720  6593 ± 717  15952 ± 2685 
1998  2280 ± 370  3513 ± 433  6979 ± 1199 
1997  1912 ± 535  3081 ± 840  5388 ± 938 
1996  1199 ± 238  2163 ± 308  3845 ± 918 
1995  920 ± 345  1378 ± 487  3000 ± 740 
1994  743 ± 138  1089 ± 215  2638 ± 478 
Millions of dollars 
 
 -  Comparison between expected and actual (table 7) : 
 
Table 7      Microsoft: Actual Results 
 
Year NI  OI  SE 
2003 9993 13217  61020 
2002 7829 11910  52180 
2001 7346 11720  47289 
2000 9421 10937  41368 
1999 7785 9928 28428 








































81998 4490 6414 16627 
1997 3454 5130 10777 
1996 2195 3078 6908 
1995 1453 2038 5333 
1994 1146 1726 4450 
Sources: Form 10K; millions of dollars. 
 











2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
(NI - maxexpectedNI)/NI (OI - maxexpectedOI)/OI (SE - maxexpectedSE)/SE
 
 
In 27 cases out of 30, Microsoft is outside the 95% confidence interval. The three 
cases where Microsoft is in our interval are net income in 2003 and operating income 
in 2003 and 2002. Net income (NI) and Operating Income (OI) follow the same trend 
of marginally decreasing surplus returns compared with the rest of the industry from 
the beginning of the 2000. Stockholder Equity is still 50% higher than expected, 
showing the continuity and strength of the profit engine that has become Microsoft. 
Globally, from 1994 to 2003 Microsoft earned 55 billions of net income and should 
have earned 35 billions if it had no market power. In another way, 36% of Microsoft’s 
net incomes are monopole profits. But we must recognize that these monopolistic 
profits have been diminishing for two or three years. Has Schmalensee’s prophecy 
been realised? Where could it come from while the Internet browsers and Java 
competition never arrives and while the dominant position of Microsoft on his two 
main markets (operating systems for micro and personal productivity) has not been 
challenged? Different reasons might explain this marginal decline of Microsoft’s 
profitability (table 9). 
 
Table 9    Microsoft: Income Statements 
 
 2003 2002 2001  2000
Turnover 32187 28365 25296  22956
Cost of sales  5686 5191 3455  3000
R&D 
Sales & marketing 





















































8Operating income  13217 11910 11720  10937
Investment income  1577 - 305 - 36  3326
Net income  9993 7829 7346  9421
Employment 55000 50500 47600  39100
Sources: Form 10K, millions of dollars 
 
The data of these last few years can be analysed as follow: 
- Organisational slack and investment into new sectors (the accounts of the firm do not 
allow us to distinguish between these two distinct phenomenona). For several years 
Microsoft has been investing into Consumer Electronics (home and entertainment) 
with its MSN network and game consoles (Xbox). This can explain the growth of the 
items Cost of Sales and Sales & Marketing. Microsoft announced losses of 1 billion 
dollars in the year 2000, 1.7, 1.8 and 1.4 for the years 2001, 2002, 2003 in the 
consumer electronic sector (Form 10K). The high profits on monopole activities 
allowed Microsoft to finance its strategic diversification, whatever the price. 
- Monopole costs: Microsoft has to pay for the costs of the anti-trust lawsuits. These 
costs include lobbying, files and fees and are computed into the General & 
Administrative item. Difficult to evaluate, they represent between 200 and 600 
millions de dollars a year from 1998 to 2003 and they are growing (Form 10K). For 
three years, one has to add compensations that Microsoft paid to competitors to avoid 
justice trials. These compensations were 660 millions of dollars in 2002 and 1 billion 
dollars in 2003 (of which 750 millions to AOL-TimeWarner). 
- Strategic management of provisions: Microsoft has a cash flow of several tens of 
billions of dollars. It depreciated telecommunications investments for the years 2001 
and 2002. 
For the years 2000, Microsoft sustained higher costs. These costs are direct and 
indirect monopole costs. These costs taken aside, Microsoft is still largely outside the 




Our model is very simple and there are other sources of extra-profits than scale. The 
analysis we present is mainly adapted to horizontal single markets
13. The software 
industry is subject to scope economies, either vertical (for instance between operating 
systems and application software) or horizontal (for instance between diverse modules 
of an ERP package). Let us note that our representation and calculus of scale 
economies implicitly include scope economies although we are not able to control for 
that. This can induce a small bias against Microsoft. 
On the other side, our sample has a bias in favour of Microsoft. It is based on the 35 
first firms of the industry. These firms can themselves benefit from market power. If 
the global concentration ratio can be seen to be weak - C4 of about 26% in 1998 – the 
software industry shares with the pharmaceutical industry the fact that this kind of 
measure makes no sense because these industries are « natively » differentiated. We 
know that in the pharmaceutical industry, there exist 10 families of disease with 
                                                           
13 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this point to us. 








































8appropriate medicines. The competition between these families of medicine does not 
exist. The situation is the same in the software industry: an antivirus software is not in 
competition with a statistical package. From an industrial economic perspective, it is 
the concentration by family that makes sense and the latter is often high (Genthon, 
2004). The other firms of our sample can then be in an oligopolistic position and 
benefit themselves from market power. What we measure is the extra market power of 
Microsoft in comparison to the market power of the other firms of our sample. In 




We tried to identify the market power of Microsoft from an empirical work based on 
industrial data. We tried to show that this market power is long standing. Our 
measures tend to show that Microsoft obtains more profit that the structural conditions 
of the industry allow it to benefit. The results do not depend of the precise measures of 
the economies of scale and seem statistically robust. This comes from the enormous 
market power Microsoft benefit. Does it use and abuse it? This question is outside the 
scope of this study. 










































Table A1      Estimations of Net Income 
 



















































t-ratios in parentheses; * : p < 0,001 
 
Table A2      Estimations of stockholder equity 
 



















































t-ratios in parentheses; * : p < 0,001 
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